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Modification of Written Contracts
m Californma*
By RicHARD TiMBIE**
AT common law, the parol evidence rule bars evidence of a prior
or contemporaneous oral agreement to alter the terms of an un-
ambiguous written contract. A written contract can, however, be re-
scmded or modified by a subsequent oral contract unless the subject
matter of the contract as modified is within the statute of frauds.1
Even an express provision in the written contract that it can be modi-
fied only in writing will not bar oral modification, for such a provision
can be expressly or impliedly altered, wmved, or revoked by an oral
agreement.' California is one of a very few states that has rejected
the common law rule and bars enforcement of executory oral altera-
tions of written contracts.'
The California statute, Civil Code section 1698,1 was enacted in
1872 as part of the first California Civil Code. 5 Like most of that
* This article was prepared to provide the California Law Revision Commis-
sion with background information for its study of this subject. The opinions, conclu-
sions, and recommendations of the author do not necessarily represent or reflect the
opimons, conclusions, or recommendations of the commission.
** J.D., 1971, Stanford Law School.
1. 6 S. WmLLISTON, A TRFATsE ON TnE LAW OF CONRACTS § 1828 at 5178-79
(rev. ed. 1938) [hereinafter cited as WrLLISTON]; see 6 A. ColiniN, CoNTRACTS § 1294
at 201-05 (1962) [hereinafter cited as CoRniN]; REsrATEMENT OF CoNr-RCTrS § 407
(1932).
2. 6 CoRBiN, supra note 1, § 1295 at 205-08; 6 WILLISTON, supra note 1,
§ 1828 at 5179.
3. Four other states have adopted versions of the Californa rule. MoNT. REv.
CODES ANN. § 13-907 (1947); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-09-06 (1959); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, § 237 (1966); S.D. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 53-8-7 (1967). A New York statute
and the Uniform Commercial Code have adopted a rule barring oral modification
only pursuant to an express provision in a written contract requiring modification or
rescission to be in writing. See N.Y. GEN. OBLIGATiONS LAw § 15-301 (McKinney
1964); UNIwoRM COMMERCAL CODE § 2-209.
4. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1698 (West 1954).
5. CAL. Civ. CODE ANN. § 1698 (1872).
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code, section 1698 was derived from David Dudley Field's proposed
New York Civil Code.' However, the analogous Field Code provision
was merely a codification of the common law rule limiting modifica-
tion of contracts under seal:
A contract under seal may be altered by an agreement under
seal, or by an executed agreement without seal; and not other-
wise, except as to time of performance, which may be extended
by any form of agreement.7
The Field Code provision governing modification of unsealed contracts
restated the common law rule validating modification by oral or written
contract.8 Since the 1872 California Civil Code abolished the distinc-
tion between sealed and unsealed instruments,9 the common law rule
limiting modification only of sealed contracts was inapplicable in Cal-
ifornia. Rather than apply to all written contracts the common law
rule validating oral modification of unsealed written contracts, the
California Code Commissioners adopted a rule similar to that which
has governed sealed contracts under the common law:
1698. A contract in writing may be altered by a contract in
writing, or by an executed oral agreement; and not other-
wise.' 0
The code commissioners made no attempt to articulate their rea-
sons for adopting this unprecedented rule," and the few commentators
who have discussed the California rule have not attempted to evaluate
it in policy terms.' 2 It is, however, possible to identify three general
policies that might be furthered by a rule restricting oral modification
of written contracts. First, such a rule tends to alleviate the danger
that a party will attempt to avoid his duties -under a* written contract
6. See Commissioners of the Code, THE CIVIL CODE OF THE STATE OF NEW
YORK (1865).
7. Id. § 843 (footnotes omitted).
8. See id. § 842.
9. CAL. CV. CODE § 1629 (West 1954); cf. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1932
(West 1955).
10. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1698 (West 1954). As originally enacted in 1872, the
section ended with the phrase "except as to the time of performance, which may be
extended by any form of agreement." This qualification, taken verbatim from section
843 of the Field Code (see text accompanying note 7 supra), was deleted by an amend-
ment in 1874. AMENDMENTS TO CAL. CODES 1873-74, at 862.
11. See CAL. CIv. CODE ANN. § 1698, Note (1872). The Commissioners' Note
to section 1698 was taken largely from the footnotes to Field Code section 843, and it
refers to the statute as a liberalization of the rule formerly governing sealed contracts
rather than as a limitation on modification of unsealed written contracts.
12. But see Macaulay, Justice Traynor and the Law of Contracts, 13 STAN. L.
REv. 812, 827-32 (1961) (evaluating in policy terms certain cases interpreting sec-
tion 1698).
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or justify his altered performance through a fraudulent allegation of
an oral agreement to modify the written contract. Second, to the ex-
tent that the rule induces the parties to written contracts to commit
their modifications to writing, it increases certainty and clarity in con-
tractual relations and tends to reduce the incidence of litigation over
the existence and terms of such modifications. When a party signs
a written modification, he is more likely to reflect on its terms and to
consider himself bound by it than when he orally assents to a proposed
modification. More importantly, the potential for misunderstandings
and disputes over the terms of such agreements is reduced when the
modification is memorialized in a writing to which the parties can
refer for clarification of their rights and duties. Third, the task of the
courts in determining the rights and duties of the parties once litigation
arises is simpler and more efficient when a modification agreement
is written than when it is oral. Much, if not all, of the evidence intro-
duced to prove the existence and terms of an alleged oral agreement
will often consist of the conflicting, self-serving, parol claims of the
parties.
There are, on the other hand, sound policy considerations against
a strict rule barring oral modification. Such a rule can be an instru-
ment for perpetrating fraud when one party induces another to per-
form or otherwise change his position in reliance on an oral modifica-
tion and then avoids his reciprocal duties by invoking the rule barring
oral modification. Even in the absence of fraud, the justifications for
the rule assume that its existence will cause parties to a written con-
tract to put their modification agreements in writing. Nevertheless,
experience has proved that despite section 1698 parties make oral
agreements altering their written contracts and perform in reliance on
those oral agreements. When such agreements are supported by con-
sideration and otherwise valid, refusal to enforce them conflicts with
the general principles of freedom of contract-that the law will en-
force bargained exchanges freely made by private individuals. More-
over, once a party has performed in reliance on such an oral modifica-
tion, refusal to enforce it conflicts with a fundamental principle of
equity by causing an unjust loss to the party who has performed and
a windfall to the party who is allowed to avoid his obligations under
the oral agreement or demand performance pursuant to the original
written contract.
The history of the California courts' interpretation and application
of section 1698 has reflected the tension between the policies justifying
the rule barring oral modification and the policies against applying
the rule in particular classes of cases. When the desirable effects of
the rule are not offset by countervailing policy considerations, the
courts have interpreted it liberally and applied it consistently. In
classes of cases in which the rule serves no purpose or in which its
application would result in injustice, the courts have avoided its oper-
ation by stretching the facts of the cases to take the alleged agreement
out of section 1698, by stretching equitable doctrines of waiver and
estoppel to avoid the bar of section 1698, or by interpreting the statute
not to apply. This process of judicial avoidance and interpretation
entailed a great deal of litigation over the meaning of section 1698
and the scope and substance of the exceptions to it, but it has now
resulted in a set of well-settled rules governing the modification of
written contracts.
The purpose of this article is to evaluate California law governing
alteration of written contracts. It will first survey the judicial interpre-
tation of section 1698 in order to ascertain the scope and content of
the California rule and the degree to which the California rule, as
interpreted by the courts, differs from the common law. It will then
discuss two other rules that have been formulated to limit oral modi-
fication of written contracts: section 2-209 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code (UCC), which invalidates oral modifications only if the
parties include a provision in the original written contract requiring
modification to be made in writing, and section 2209 of the California
Commercial Code 3 (California's version of the UCC) which replaces
the Uniform Commercial Code rule with a rule substantially similar
to section 1698 but attempts to overrule one judicially formulated ex-
ception to section 1698. Finally, section 1698 will be evaluated in
comparison with the common law, UCC section 2-209, and Califor-
nia Commercial Code section 2209 to determine what changes should
be made in California law in order to best achieve clarity and con-
sistency, to further the policies behind the law's preference for written
agreements, and to avoid sanctioning fraud or requiring unjust results
when a party has relied to his detriment on an oral modification.
Judicial Interpretation and Application of Section 1698
Section 1698 purports to govern the enforceability of all attempts
to modify a written contract by a subsequent agreement. 4 Both the
13. CAL. COMM. CODE § 2209 (West Supp. 1971).
14. Modification of oral contracts is governed by section 1697 of the Civil Code,
which validates all written or oral modification agreements whether or not they are
supported by consideration. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1697 (West 1954).
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policies involved in a given class of cases, which have affected the
courts' interpretation of and willingness to apply the statute, and the
result called for by the statute depend upon three factors: whether the
modification agreement is written or oral, whether or not it is supported
by consideration, and whether one or both parties has rendered part
or full performance pursuant to the modification agreement. The
scope and content of the statute is, therefore, most clearly ascertainable
when it is analyzed in terms of these three factors.
Modifications in Writing
Section 1698 validates executory alteration of a written contract
only by a "contract" in writing.' 5  The California Supreme Court has
interpreted this language literally, holding that an executory written
modification must be signed by the party against whom enforcement
is sought and must meet the requirements of a valid contract.16 The
most significant ramification of this interpretation is the applicability
of the "pre-existing duty rule:" The modification agreement must be
supported by new consideration, not simply by the pre-existing duty
of a party under the original contract.' Accordingly, an executory
written agreement to pay more for the same performance called for in
the written contract or to render the same performance in return for
reduced performance by the other party is unenforceable. However,
when both parties' rights and duties are altered by the agreement or
when the agreement substitutes one form of performance for another,
the surrender of rights and termination of obligations under the writ-
ten contract constitutes sufficient consideration to render the modifica-
tion enforceable.' 8
The pre-existing duty rule is consistent with the common law,
which treats an executory agreement not supported by consideration as
an executory gift.' 9 Absent detrimental reliance, executory gifts are
unenforceable, whether or not they are in writing."0 Further, although
the issue has not arisen in any reported case, an executed written modi-
fication agreement would clearly be as enforceable as an executed oral
agreement irrespective of the presence or absence of consideration.
15. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
16. Main St. & Agricultural Park R.R. v. Los Angeles Traction Co., 129 Cal. 301,
305, 61 P. 937, 938-39 (1900).
17. Id.
18. D.L. Godbey & Sons Constr. Co. v. Deane, 39 Cal. 2d 429, 246 P.2d 946
(1952).
19. See Julian v. Gold, 214 Cal. 74, 79, 3 P.2d 1009, 1011 (1931).
20. See 1 CoIm, supra note 1, §§ 4, 114.
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Oral Modifications
Fully Executed Oral Agreements
Section 1698 validates two means of modifying a written contract:
by a "contract in writing" and by an "executed oral agreement." The
California courts have interpreted the use of the word "agreement"
in the latter phrase, as juxtaposed to "'contract" in the former, to imply
that an executed modification need not constitute a valid contract in
order to be enforceable; in particular, such an agreement need not be
supported by consideration. 21
When both parties have performed pursuant to an oral modifica-
tion agreement, whether or not supported by consideration, neither
party can enforce any provision of the original written contract that
is inconsistent with the executed alteration.22 In Scott v. TraveLodge
Corporation,2 3 for example, the parties to a lease orally agreed to re-
duce the rent payable by TraveLodge in light of the lessor's breach of
various covenants in the lease obligating the lessor to build and main-
tain a bar and restaurant adjacent to the property leased by Trave-
Lodge. Because TraveLodge had paid and the landlord had accepted
the reduced rent called for by the oral modification, the agreement
was executed and barred both the lessor's suit for the difference be-
tween the rent called for in the original lease and the reduced rent
actually paid and the lessee's counterclaim for the damages arising out
of the lessor's breach of his covenant to build and maintain the restau-
rant.
Only the oral agreement, not necessarily the written contract as
modified, need be executed to render the modification enforceable. 4
Thus, in Waldteufel v. Sailor25 a real estate broker was due an $855
commission under a written brokerage contract for finding a buyer
for defendant's land. He orally agreed to accept instead $1,000 in
$100 installments, payable as the buyer made payments to the de-
fendant for the land. After two installments had been paid the buyer
21. Julian v. Gold, 214 Cal. 74, 76, 3 P.2d 1009, 1010 (1931); Treadwell v.
Nickel, 194 Cal. 243, 258-59, 228 P. 25, 32 (1924); see Jewell v. Colonial Theater
Co., 12 Cal. App. 681, 684, 108 P. 527, 528 (1910); Hause v. Phillips, 2 Cal. App.
15, 17, 82 P. 1127, 1128 (1905).
22. E.g., Fidler v. Schiller, 212 Cal. App. 2d 569, 573-74, 28 Cal. Rptr. 48, 51
(1963); Bleakley v. Carries, 209 Cal. App. 2d 577, 588-89, 26 Cal. Rptr. 115, 122
(1962); Keeble v. Brown, 123 Cal. App. 2d 126, 131-32, 266 P.2d 569, 573 (1954);
Roberts v. Wachter, 104 Cal. App. 2d 271, 279-80, 231 P.2d 534, 539 (1951).
23. 265 Cal. App. 2d 881, 71 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1968).
24. See Platt v. Butcher, 112 Cal. 634, 44 P. 1060 (1896).
25. 62 Cal. App. 2d 577, 144 P.2d 894 (1944) (alternative holding).
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defaulted. The broker sued for the remainder of the commission due
under the written contract, and the court affirmed a judgment for the
defendant on the ground that the oral modification had been fully ex-
ecuted and barred enforcement of the written contract.
The California rule enforcing an executed oral alteration of a
written contract whether or not supported by consideration is consistent
with the common law rules. An oral contract to alter the terms of a
written contract is enforceable at common law whether or not it is ex-
ecuted.2 6 In addition, a gratuitous oral agreement that has been fully
performed constitutes an executed gift, which is enforceable at com-
mon law."
Wholly Executory Oral Agreements
When neither party has rendered performance pursuant to an
alleged oral agreement to modify a written contract, the agreement
is unenforceable under California law irrespective of the presence or
absence of consideration.28  Nevertheless, if one party, although he
has not rendered performance pursuant to the alleged oral agreement,
has materially changed his position or otherwise relied on the other
party's oral promise, the party attempting to avoid the oral agreement
may be estopped to raise its invalidity under section 1698.29
Insofar as it bars enforcement of executory gratuitous oral al-
terations, California law accords with the common law. 0 Insofar as
it invalidates executory oral agreements supported by consideration,
however, the California rule differs from the common law, which en-
forces such contracts unless they are barred by the Statute of Frauds.31
Oral Modifications Fully Performed in Part
When an oral agreement modifying a written contract is to be
performed by the parties in installments or in severable units-for ex-
26. See note 1 & accompanying text supra.
27. See notes 19-20 & accompanying text supra.
28. E.g., Molera v. Cooper, 173 Cal. 259, 261-62, 160 P. 231, 232 (1916);
Goodman v. Citizens Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 253 Cal. App. 2d 807, 817, 61 Cal. Rptr.
682, 688 (1967); Middlecamp v. Zumwalt, 100 Cal. App. 715, 721-23, 280 P. 1003,
1006 (1929).
29. Wagner v. Shapona, 123 Cal. App. 2d 451, 459-60, 267 P.2d 378, 383 (1954),
disapproved on other grounds, Neff v. Ernst, 48 Cal. 2d 628, 634, 311 P.2d 849, 853
(1957); Wade v. Markwell & Co., 118 Cal. App. 2d 410, 421, 258 P.2d 497, 503
(1953).
30. See note 20 & accompanying text supra.
31. See note 1 & accompanying text supra.
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ample, a lease or employment contract calling for periodic payment
of rent or salary, a loan contract or sales contract calling for payment
in installments, or an output or requirements contract calling for de-
livery and payment in installments-a dispute may arise as to the en-
forceability of the oral agreement after part of the agreement has been
performed by both parties. Two early California Supreme Court cases
held such agreements, supported by consideration, are enforceable in-
sofar as they have been performed but invalid insofar as they are
executory. In dicta, however, these cases indicated that, in the ab-
sence of consideration for the modification, such agreements are invalid
both as to the executed installments and as to the executory install-
ments. 2  The holding in those cases has been followed consistently
in subsequent cases involving oral modifications supported by consid-
eration and fully performed in part .3 The dicta, on the other hand,
gave rise to a great deal of litigation and confusion until they were
rejected over twenty-five years later. In some cases the courts found
that the gratuitous modifications which had been fully performed in
part were wholly unenforceable, thus allowing the promissor34 to en-
force the original written contract both as to the executed installments
and as to the executory installments. 5 In other cases involving a
gratuitous agreement to accept reduced payment under a written con-
tract, the courts found the executed installments enforceable by char-
acterizing the oral modification as a waiver. Acceptance of the re-
duced payments by the promissor constituted a waiver of his right to
full payment under the terms of the written contract; as to the past
installments, the waiver was executed and therefore irrevocable, but
as to the future installments, the waiver was revocable since it was not
supported by consideration. 36  One other case arrived at the same re-
32. Sinnige v. Oswald, 170 Cal. 55, 57, 148 P. 203, 204 (1915); In re McDou-
gald's Estate, 146 Cal. 196, 199, 79 P. 875, 876 (1905).
33. E.g., Eluschuck v. Chemical Eng'rs Termite Control, Inc., 246 Cal. App. 2d
463, 469, 54 Cal. Rptr. 711, 715 (1966); Taylor v. Taylor, 39 Cal. App. 2d 518, 522,
103 P.2d 575, 577 (1940); Anderson v. Adler, 42 Cal. App. 776, 779, 184 P. 42,
43 (1919).
34. A gratuitous modification is more appropriately characterized as a unilateral
promise than an "agreement" since, by definition, the duties of only one party are
altered by the modification. See text accompanying notes 47-50 infra. In speaking
of such modifications, the term "promissor" will be used to denote the party who
assumes a new duty or gives up a right, and the other party will be referred to as the
"promissee."
35. Wayland v. Latham, 89 Cal. App. 55, 63-64, 264 P. 766, 770 (1928);
Gordon v. Green, 51 Cal. App. 765, 768, 197 P. 955, 956 (1921).
36. Alden v. Mayfield, 164 Cal. 6, 9, 127 P. 45, 47 (1912); Thompson v.
Gorner, 104 Cal. 168, 170, 37 P. 900, 901 (1894).
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sult by characterizing the executed portion of the oral agreement as a
severable agreement which had been fully executed and was, therefore,
enforceable.87
In 1931, in Julian v. Gold,8 the California Supreme Court aban-
doned the waiver rationale and adopted a rule based on an interpreta-
tion of section 1698. In Julian a landlord had orally agreed to reduce
the rent on business property leased by the defendant. After the lessor
had paid and the landlord had accepted the reduced monthly payments
for two of the three years remaining under the written lease, the land-
lord brought suit to collect the difference between the rent paid and
the rent due under the written contract. The trial court awarded a
verdict to the plaintiff on the ground that the oral agreement was not
supported by consideration and had not been fully executed. The
supreme court reversed in an opinion which does not even refer to the
fact that the oral agreement had been performed for only two of the
three years remaining on the lease; instead, the court simply assumed
that the fully performed portion of an oral modification constitutes an
executed oral agreement under section 1698. Most of the opinion is
devoted to a discussion of the issue of the necessity for consideration
to validate executed oral agreements. After dismissing as dicta the
prior statements that consideration is required, the court held that oral
modifications, insofar as they have been executed, are enforceable ir-
respective of the presence or absence of consideration.3"
In Julian the enforceability of the oral agreement for the portion
of the contract that had not yet been performed was not at issue, but
the language of the opinion implied that such an agreement is unen-
forceable insofar as it is executory. A subsequent case, Stoltenberg
v. Harveston,40 explicitly adopted such a rule:
In so far as the payments of rent made under the oral agreement
of the parties are concerned, there can be no question that as
to those payments actually made and accepted as rent in full
for the period covered by them, the oral agreement reducing
37. Wright v. Beeson, 159 Cal. 133, 137-38, 112 P. 1091, 1092 (1911).
38. 214 Cal. 74, 3 P.2d 1009 (1931), noted in Comment, 20 C~An'. L REv.
552 (1932).
39. Id. at 76, 3 P.2d at 1010. The court alternatively based its holding on
California Code of Civil Procedure § 2076 (West 1955) which provided: "The person
to whom a tender is made must, at the time, specify any objection he may have to the
money, instrument, or property, or he must be deemed to have waived it; and if the
objection be to the amount of money, the terms of the instrument, or the amount or
kind of property, he must specify the amounts, terms, or kind which he requires, or
be precluded from objecting afterwards." See 214 Cal. at 79, 3 P.2d at 1011.
40. 1 Cal. 2d 264, 34 P.2d 472 (1934).
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the rent was executed and no claim for the recovery of rent
during the period covered by said payments can be maintained.
(Julian v. Gold .) As to the monthly payments of rent due
under said lease and not actually paid by the lessees, a different
rule governs. As to such payments the oral agreement to ac-
cept amounts less than those called for in the written lease had
not been executed. 41
The Julian-Stoltenberg rule has been followed consistently in re-
ported cases involving oral modifications fully performed in part, wheth-
er gratuitous 42 or supported by consideration,4  but three qualifica-
tions should be considered in conjunction with the rule. First, the
rule is not applicable to installments or portions of the contract that
have not been performed in conformity with the oral modification.
Thus, when installments have come due under the oral agreement
but they have not been paid or an amount less than was due under the
oral agreement has been paid, the modification is not executed as to
those installments, and the promisor can demand payment of the full
amount called for in the written contract.4 4  Second, when the oral
modification is supported by consideration and only one party has
fully performed one or more installments pursuant to the oral agree-
ments, those installments may be held to be executed under a rule to
be considered in the following section. 45  Third, when a party has
materially changed his position in reliance on the oral agreement, the
court may invoke the doctrine of estoppel to bar the other party from
asserting the invalidity of the executory portion of the oral modifica-
tion.46
The Julian-Stoltenberg rule conforms to the common law as ap-
plied to gratuitous agreements, which are enforceable as gifts only in-
sofar as they are executed. It departs from the common law only in
refusing to enforce the executory portion of oral modifications sup-
ported by consideration.
41. Id. at 266, 34 P.2d at 472.
42. E.g., California Canning Peach Growers v. Williams, 11 Cal. 2d 221, 230,
78 P.2d 1154, 1159 (1938); Kaliterna v. Wright, 94 Cal. App. 2d 926, 934-35, 212
P.2d 32, 37 (1949); Elliot v. Agajanian, 19 Cal. App. 2d 244, 250, 64 P.2d 1159, 1162
(1937).
43. See cases cited in note 33 supra.
44. See, e.g., Cirimele v. Shinazy, 124 Cal. App. 2d 46, 49-50, 268 P.2d 210,
212-13 (1954); Rogers v. Rogers, 49 Cal. App. 2d 366, 369-70, 121 P.2d 819, 821
(1942); Western Mach. Co. v. Graetz, 42 Cal. App. 2d 296, 299, 108 P.2d 711, 713
(1940).
45. See text accompanying notes 74-85 infra.
46. See, e.g., Wilson v. Bailey, 8 Cal. 2d 416, 422-24, 65 P.2d 770, 772-73
(1937); Wagner v. Shapona, 123 Cal. App. 2d 451, 459-60, 267 P.2d 378, 383 (1954);
Panno v. Russo, 82 Cal. App. 2d 408, 412, 186 P.2d 452, 454 (1947).
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Oral Agreements Performed by Only One Party
The most controversial issue arising under section 1698, and that
which has engendered the greatest amount of litigation, is the en-
forceability of oral modifications that have been performed by only
one party. Performance by only one party presents no new analytic
issue when the modification is gratuitous. A gratuitous oral agree-
ment, by definition, alters the duties of only one party; if the agree-
ment altered the duties of both parties, the surrender of rights, and
assumption of duties would constitute consideration.4 7  Thus, execu-
tion of a gratuitous agreement entails performance by only one party-
the promisor4 8  For example, if A and B have a written contract and
A orally promises to pay more for B's performance under the contract
or to accept reduced performance by B, only A, the promisor, can
execute the agreement. Performance by B would be referable only to
his obligations -under the written contract since he has assumed no
new duties under the oral agreement. The modification, as opposed
to the contract as modified, is wholly executory until A has paid the
increased compensation or accepted the decreased performance by B
and is fully executed when A has done so. Although courts have
generally not recognized the logical inconsistency in speaking of per-
formance by the promissee, they have properly held that performance
by the promisor renders a gratuitous oral agreement enforceable 49
while performance by the promissee does not.50
When an oral modification is supported by consideration, both
parties must necessarily have assumed some character of duty not called
for under the written contract.5 ' The agreement, therefore, is no long-
er wholly executory when one party has performed, but it is not fully
executed until both parties have performed. Section 1698 validates
only executed oral agreements, and Civil Code section 1661, enacted
at the same time as section 1698, defines "executed": "An executed
47. See note 18 & accompanying text supra.
48. See note 34 supra.
49. E.g., see cases cited in note 42 supra.
50. See, e.g., Goodman v. Citizens Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 253 Cal. App. 2d 807,
817, 61 Cal. Rptr. 682, 688 (1967); Nicholson v. Smith, 98 Cal. App. 2d 163, 164,
219 P.2d 39, 40 (1950); Southern Pac. Milling Co. v. Billiwhack Stock Farm, Ltd.,
50 Cal. App. 2d 79, 85, 122 P.2d 650, 653 (1942); Columbia Cas. Co. v. Lewis
14 Cal. App. 2d 64, 72, 57 P.2d 1010, 1013 (1936); Harvey v. DeGarmo, 129 Cal.
App. 487, 492-93, 18 P.2d 971, 973 (1933); Harbor Constr. Co. v. Walters, 101 Cal.
App. 470, 477-78, 281 P. 1062, 1065 (1929).
51. Even when the agreement calls for substitute performance by A in returi
for the same performance by B that is called for in the written contract, B has
assumed a duty to accept the substitute performance.
contract is one, the object of which is fully performed. All others are
executory."52  Read together, these statutes appear to preclude en-
forcement of oral modifications until the agreement has been fully
performed by both parties.
In 1952, in D.L. Godbey & Sons v. Deane,3 the California
Supreme Court announced the rule, purported to be an interpretation
of section 1698, that an oral agreement altering the terms of a written
contract is executed, and therefore enforceable, if it is supported by
consideration and has been performed by one party. Commentators
have generally regarded the Godbey rule as a departure from prior
law that oral agreements must be fully performed by both parties in
order to be executed.54 A careful survey of the cases prior to Godbey
reveals that the rule was not a departure from existing law but simply
a rationalization of it. Despite dicta in numerous cases that an oral
modification is unenforceable until fully performed by both parties,55
no reported California case arriving at a result inconsistent with the
Godbey rule could be found by this author. Rather, California courts
have consistently been unwilling to invalidate an oral modification
supported by consideration when one party has performed in reliance
on the oral agreement and refusal to enforce it would result in either
a loss to the party seeking to enforce the agreement or a windfall to
the other.5 6
Case law prior to Godbey. Several cases prior to Godbey en-
forced such an oral modification by ignoring the fact that one party
52. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1661 (West 1954).
53. 39 Cal. 2d 429, 246 P.2d 946 (1952).
54. See 1 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW Contracts § 319 at 345
(1960); Macaulay, Justice Traynor and the Law of Contracts, 13 STAN. L. REV. 812,
828 (1961); 40 CALIF. L. REV. 599 (1952); 4 HASTINGS L.J. 59 (1952). See also
text accompanying note 109 infra.
55. E.g., Stoltenberg v. Harveston, 1 Cal. 2d 264, 266-67, 34 P.2d 472, 472-73
(1934); Pearsall v. Henry, 153 Cal. 314, 325, 95 P. 154, 157 (1908); Henehan v.
Hart, 127 Cal. 656, 658, 60 P. 426, 427 (1900); Walther v. Occidental Life Ins. Co.,
40 Cal. App. 2d 160, 166, 104 P.2d 551, 554 (1940); Klein Norton Co. v. Cohen,
107 Cal. App. 325, 330-31, 290 P. 613, 616 (1930).
56. The sole exception to this generality is a line of cases involving brokerage
contracts for the sale of real property. The Statute of Frauds requires such agree-
ments to be in writing-see CAL. CIV. CODE § 1624 (West 1954)-and when an oral
modification is alleged which is inconsistent with a written brokerage contract or pur-
ports to revive or extend such a contract beyond its termination date, courts have re-
fused to enforce the alleged oral modification despite performance by the broker.
See Platt v. Butcher, 112 Cal. 634, 636, 44 P. 1060 (1896); Boyd v. Big Tree Ranch
Co., 22 Cal. App. 108, 110, 133 P. 623, 624 (1913); Beaver v. Continental Bldg. &
Loan Ass'n, 15 Cal. App. 190, 194, 116 P. 1105, 1106 (1911).
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had yet to perform and announcing the result that the agreement was
executed. 5' These cases all had several elements in common: the
performance rendered was markedly different from that called for by
the written contract and was referable to the alleged agreement; perform-
ance constituted consideration for the agreement; the performance de-
manded of the other party was a cash payment pursuant to the modi-
fied contract; and the court's refusal to enforce the oral modification
would have resulted in a substantial windfall for the other party.
These cases, in which the court avoided a manifestly unjust result by
simply announcing a conclusion without giving any justification or sup-
port, constitute only a small fraction of the cases that reached a result
consistent with the Godbey rule. In most such cases, the court ex-
pressly or impliedly assumed that section 1698 requires an oral modi-
fication to be performed on both sides in order to be enforceable but
avoided invalidating the agreement by applying and expanding the
mitigating doctrines of novation and substitution, collateral contract,
and estoppel to take the case out of section 1698.
Prior to Godbey, the most frequently employed method of en-
forcing an oral modification fully performed by one party, despite
section 1698, was to interpret the oral agreement as a novation or an
oral termination of the written contract and the substitution of an oral
contract. Since section 1698 applies only to modifications of written
contracts, it has been held not to affect the common law rule that a
written contract, whether or not it is within the Statute of Frauds,
can be rescinded or terminated orally.53 In Pearsall v. Henry,5 9 the
California Supreme Court held that an oral agreement is enforceable
if, instead of modifying a prior written. contract, it terminates the writ-
ten contract and substitutes the terms of a new oral contract. Whether
the oral agreement constitutes a modification of the written contract
or termination of the written contract and a substitution of the oral
contract was held to be a question of fact that depends on the intent of
the parties at the time of the oral agreement. 60 The Pearsall rule,
57. Roberts v. Wachter, 104 Cal. App. 2d 271, 280, 231 P.2d 534, 539 (1951);
Nuttman v. Chais, 101 Cal. App. 2d 476, 478, 225 P.2d 660, 661 (1950); Estate of
Morrison, 68 Cal. App. 2d 280, 285, 156 P.2d 473, 475-76 (1945); State Fin. Co. v.
Hershel Cal. Fruit Prods. Co., 8 Cal. App. 2d 524, 529, 47 P.2d 821, 823 (1935);
see Wood v. Nelson, 220 Cal. 139, 141, 29 P.2d 854, 855 (1934); Anderson v. John-
ston, 120 Cal. 657, 659, 53 P. 264, 264-65 (1898); Moore v. Borgfeldt, 96 Cal. App.
306, 311, 273 P. 1114, 1117 (1929).
58. McClure v. Alberti, 190 Cal. 348, 350, 212 P. 204, 205 (1923).
59. 153 Cal. 314, 95 P. 154 (1908).
60. Treadwell v. Nickel, 194 Cal. 243, 259, 228 P. 25, 32 (1924).
therefore, meant that one could ascertain the enforceability of an oral
agreement that was inconsistent with a prior written contract only
through a lawsuit, and as a result, it engendered a great deal of liti-
gation.61
In addition to causing litigation, the Pearsall rule provided courts
with a ready means of avoiding the bar of section 1698 in cases in
which one party had performed an oral modification. In some of the
cases that enforced an oral agreement performed by one party as a
novation or substituted contract, the written contract had expired by
its own terms 62 or the parties clearly intended to terminate the written
contract,6" and in others the new agreement was so different from the
written contract that an intent to abrogate the written contract could
legitimately be inferred. 64 In many cases, however, the "substituted"
oral agreement incorporated most of the terms of the written contract
and could equally well have been characterized as an oral modifica-
tion.65 The distinguishing characteristic of these latter cases was not
the character of the oral agreement, but the fact that one party had
performed in reliance on the oral modification and his performance
was inconsistent with the written contract and referrable to the oral
agreement. The courts assumed that section 1698 required full per-
formance by both parties but, by interpreting the agreement as a nova-
tion or substitution, avoided inequity and arrived at a result consistent
with the Godbey rule. 6
Because section 1698 refers only to alteration of a written con-
61. See 6 CORBIN, supra note 1, § 1295, at 208-09.
62. E.g., Treat v. Ogden, 56 Cal. App. 2d 70, 75, 132 P.2d 493, 495 (1942); see
McKeon v. Giusto, 44 Cal. 2d 152, 280 P.2d 782 (1955).
63. E.g., Gottlieb v. Tait's Inc., 97 Cal. App. 235, 237-38, 275 P. 446, 447
(1929); Roberts v. Mills, 56 Cal. App. 556, 561, 205 P. 872, 874 (1922).
64. E.g., Martin v. Butter, 93 Cal. App. 2d 562, 566, 209 P.2d 636, 638 (1949);
Arsenio v. Smith, 50 Cal. App. 173, 175, 194 P. 756, 757 (1920); Proud v. Strain,
11 Cal. App. 74, 77, 103 P. 949, 950 (1909).
65. E.g., Pearsall v. Henry, 153 Cal. 314, 317, 95 P. 194, 157 (1908); Stock-
ton Combined Harvester & Agricultural Works v. Glen Falls Ins. Co., 121 Cal. 167,
175, 53 P. 565, 569-70 (1898); Tucker v. Schumacher, 90 Cal. App. 2d 71, 75, 202
P.2d 327, 329 (1949); Miles v. Zadow, 87 Cal. App. 406, 409, 262 P. 396, 398 (1927);
Dugan v. Phillips, 77 Cal. App. 268, 277, 246 P. 566, 569 (1926); Producers Fruit Co.
v. Goddard, 75 Cal. App. 737, 755-57, 243 P. 686, 693 (1925); Robinson v. Rispin, 33
Cal. App. 536, 544-45, 165 P. 979. 982-83 (1917); Credit Clearance Bureau v. George
A. Hochbann Contracting Co., 25 Cal. App. 546, 547, 144 P. 315 (1914).
66. Since the Gobey case was decided, only two reported cases have relied on
the novation or substitution rationale to enforce an oral agreement, and in those
cases there was clear evidence of an intent to undertake a novation. Realty Corp. of
America v. Burton, 162 Cal. App. 2d 44, 56, 327 P.2d 948, 955 (1958); Bush v.
Vernon, 135 Cal. App. 2d 33, 37, 286 P.2d 903, 906 (1955).
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tract, it constitutes no bar to the making and enforcement of collateral
oral contracts that are not inconsistent with the prior written contract
although they deal with the same subject matter. Thus, if a written
contract contains a provision authorizing oral modification, a subse-
quent oral contract not inconsistent with the terms of the written con-
tract is enforceable.6 7  Similarly, if a written contract contains no ex-
press provision covering an element of a transaction, even if a term
covering that matter might otherwise be implied, courts have held a
collateral oral agreement to be enforceable whether or not it is con-
sistent with the implied term. For example, if a written sales contract
contains no price term, the court will normally imply an agreement to
sell at the market price, but a collateral oral agreement to sell at a fixed
price other than the market price is not barred by section 1698.68 In
a few cases prior to Godbey, the court applied an even broader inter-
pretation of "collateral contract" in order to enforce oral modifications
supported by consideration that had been performed by one party
when the oral agreement could be construed to resolve an ambiguity
in the written contract 69 or when the original contract indicated that
the parties intended that it should be subject to modification. 70
The doctrine of equitable estoppel is clearly applicable when a
party has materially changed his position in reliance on an oral agree-
ment in some way other than by performing pursuant to the agree-
ment.71 Estoppel has also been invoked to enforce oral agreements
to extend time for performance or to waive a condition in a written
contract when the party seeking to enforce the oral agreement alleges
that he was able to perform pursuant to the written contract and would
have done so but for the oral modification. 72  The doctrine of estoppel
is directly in conflict with section 1698 when the alleged reliance is
performance pursuant to an oral modification. If such performance
will raise an estoppel to assert the invalidity of the oral agreement,
then the requirement in section 1698 that oral modifications be exe-
cuted becomes meaningless. Nonetheless, in cases prior to Godbey
in which one party had rendered performance referrable to an oral
modification supported by consideration, the courts often relied on
67. See, e.g., Hunt v. Mahoney, 82 Cal. App. 2d 540, 187 P.2d 43 (1947).
68. Bare v. Richman & Samuels, Inc., 60 Cal. App. 2d 413, 417, 140 P.2d 895,
898 (1943).
69. Katz v. Bedford, 77 Cal. 319, 323, 19 P. 523, 525-26 (1888).
70. Lacy Mfg. Co. v. Gold Crown Mining Co., 52 Cal. App. 2d 568, 577,
126 P.2d 644, 649 (1942).
71. See notes 29 & 46 & accompanying text supra.
72. E.g., Bidegaray v. Ormaca, 48 Cal. App. 665, 669, 192 P. 176, 178 (1920).
the doctrine of estoppel to avoid invalidating oral agreements that
substantially modified the terms of prior written contracts. 73
The Godbey rule. In D.L. Godbey & Sons Construction Co. v.
Deane7 1 Justice Traynor, writing for the majority of the California
Supreme Court, validated the results of the prior cases decided on the
grounds of novation, collateral contract, and estoppel but obviated the
necessity for such mitigating doctrines in avoidance of section 1698
by interpreting the text of the statute to allow enforcement of oral
modifications supported by consideration when performed by one par-
ty. The facts of the case and the reasoning of the opinion will be
examined in detail since, in addition to supporting the contention
that the court intended to clarify and rationalize, rather than change,
the case law relating to section 1698, they shed light on the intended
scope of the rule.
Godbey was a subcontractor who had contracted to pour the con-
crete foundation and retaining walls for a building being constructed
by Deane, the prime contractor. Their written contract called for
payment to be made at a rate of $.76 per cubic foot, based on actual
measurement of the forms, but the plan called for substantial pourings
to be made outside the forms as well. Godbey alleged that, in order
to avoid a dispute in the future, he and Deane orally agreed to modify
the contract such that payment would be based on the contract rate of
$.76 per cubic foot but would be computed from the quantity of con-
crete actually delivered to the jobsite. Under the modified contract,
Godbey was to furnish Deane each day with copies of the delivery
tickets accompanying the deliveries of concrete to the jobsite. Godbey
performed the contract and furnished the delivery tickets daily. Deane
then paid him under the terms of the original contract for the amount
poured within the forms, and Godbey sued for the additional amount
due under the oral modification. Deane's demurrer was sustained by
the trial court on the ground that the oral agreement was not executed
and was, therefore, unenforceable under section 1698. The California
Supreme Court reversed.
Acknowledging that a gratuitous oral agreement to pay increased
compensation for the performance called for under the written con-
tract would be unenforceable unless executed by the promisor, Justice
Traynor first discussed the issue of consideration for the oral modifica-
73. E.g., Haumeder v. Lipsett, 90 Cal. App. 2d 167, 175-76, 202 P.2d 819, 823
(1949); Fuller v. Mann, 119 Cal. App. 568, 573-74, 6 P.2d 999, 1001 (1932); Gribling
v. Bohan, 26 Cal. App. 771, 773, 148 P. 530, 531 (1915).
74. 39 Cal. 2d 429, 246 P.2d 946 (1952).
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tion. He found that the agreement was supported by sufficient con-
sideration:
Since the modification was made before performance was
started, the substitution of the new fights and duties based upon
the new method of measurement was adequate consideration for the
relinquishment of the reciprocal rights of the parties under the old.
. . . Moreover, plaintiff promised to provide daily reports, and
both parties were relieved of the necessity of computing the volume
of the forms from linear measurements. 75
Having found that the oral agreement met the requisites of a
valid contract, the court could have enforced it by finding a termina-
tion of the written contract and a substitution of the oral contract.76
There was also adequate precedent for a finding that the oral agree-
ment constituted a collateral contract to resolve an ambiguity or mis-
take in the written contract,77 which had failed to provide for the fact
that some of the pourings would be outside the forms. Justice Tray-
nor, however, made no mention of these exceptions and proceeded to
base his holding squarely on an interpretation of the term "executed
oral agreement" in the text of section 1698. He noted that several
cases had stated in dicta that an oral alteration is not executed until
fully performed by both parties, but he found the proper rule in the
results, rather than the rationales, of the relevant cases:
[Ujn cases in which there was adequate consideration for the oral
modification, and in which the party relying thereon had fully
performed, the contract has been enforced as modified whether
or not the other party had performed on his part.78
In support of this statement, Justice Traynor cited one case in which
the court had found a termination and substitution, 79 two cases in
which the court had found a collateral contract, 0 and six cases in
which the court had simply announced the unsupported conclusion
that the oral modification was executed without reference to the fact
that it had only been performed on one side.8'
75. Id. at 431-32, 246 P.2d at 947.
76. See text accompanying notes 62-65 supra.
77. See text accompanying notes 69-70 supra.
78. 39 Cal. 2d at 433, 246 P.2d at 948,
79. Stockton Combined Harvester & Agricultural Works v. Glens Falls Ins. Co.,
121 Cal. 167, 53 P. 565 (1898).
80. Katz v. Bedford, 77 Cal. 319, 19 P. 523 (1888); Lacy Mfg. Co. v. Gold
Crown Mining Co., 52 Cal. App. 2d 568, 126 P.2d 644 (1942).
81. Wood v. Nelson, 220 Cal. 139, 29 P.2d 854 (1934); Anderson v. John-
ston, 120 Cal. 657, 53 P. 264 (1898); Roberts v. Wachter, 104 Cal. App. 2d 271,
231 P.2d 534 (1951); Nuttman v. Chais, 101 Cal. App. 2d 476, 225 P.2d 660 (1950);
State Fin. Co. v. Hershel Cal. Fruit Prods Co., 8 Cal. App. 2d 524, 47 P.2d 821 (1935);
Oatman v. Eddy, 4 Cal. App. 58, 87 P. 210 (1906).
Although the Godbey rule is consistent with the results of virtu-
ally all prior cases, it is a significant clarification and simplification of
the law. First, it disposes of the misleading rubric, often quoted but
never applied, that oral alterations supported by consideration are un-
enforceable until fully performed by both parties. Second, it relieves
courts of the necessity of drawing difficult, and often meaningless,
distinctions between oral alterations supported by consideration, oral
novations, and collateral oral contracts. After Godbey all three of
these classes of cases are treated alike in theory, as well as in fact,
if one party has performed. Finally, the rule resolves a complex body
of rules, sub rosa decisions, and express and implied exceptions into
a single, simple rule, thereby reducing uncertainty of private parties
as to their rights and duties under an oral agreement inconsistent with
a prior written contract.
A survey of the subsequent reported cases tends to support the
assertion that the Godbey rule has reduced both uncertainty and liti-
gation. In the nineteen years since Godbey was decided, only seven
reported cases have involved the issue of the enforceability of an oral
agreement inconsistent with a written contract, supported by consider-
ation, and performed on one side. Only two of these cases relied on
an exception to section 1698;82 the rest simply found the modification
to be executed.83 In the past ten years, no such case has been reported.
Qualifications of the Godbey rule. The Godbey case involved an
oral modification that was fully performed by one party, and the per-
formance rendered was, in part, referable to the alleged agreement.
The court, therefore, did not have occasion to consider the enforce-
ability of such agreements when the party seeking to enforce the
agreement has performed only in part or when none of his performance
is referable to the oral modification. Although no reported case has
been found involving the former situation, it is reasonable to assume
that the Julian-Stoltenberg rule would apply equally to cases involving
referable part performance by one party to protect his reliance interest
82. Realty Corp. of America v. Burton, 162 Cal. App. 2d 44, 57, 327 P.2d 948,
956 (1958) (novation-alternative holding); Bush v. Vernon, 135 Cal. App. 2d 33, 37,
286 P.2d 903, 906-07 (1955) (novation).
83. Maclsaac & Menke Co. v. Cardox Corp., 193 Cal. App. 2d 661, 670,
14 Cal. Rptr. 523, 528 (1961); Townsend Pierson, Inc. v. Holly-Coleman Co., 178
Cal. App. 2d 373, 377, 2 Cal. Rptr. 812, 815 (1960); Chohon v. Kersey Kinsey Co.,
173 Cal. App. 2d 548, 552, 343 P.2d 614, 617 (1959); Realty Corp. of America v.
Burton, 162 Cal. App. 2d 44, 57, 327 P.2d 948, 956 (1958) (alternative holding);
Miller v. Brown, 136 Cal. App. 2d 763, 775, 289 P.2d 572, 579 (1955).
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by enforcing the modification insofar as it has been executed by that
party's performance.8 4
In the latter situation, where no referable performance has been
rendered, there are sound policy reasons for denying enforcement:
First, the performance constitutes no extrinsic evidence of the existence
and terms of the alleged agreement, and the court would be forced
to rely exclusively on the conflicting parol claims of the parties. Sec-
ond, having rendered only the performance called for under the origi-
nal written contract, the party attempting to enforce the alleged oral
agreement has no equitable claim to protection of his reliance interest.
If enforcement is denied, he will be no worse off than if the oral
agreement had never been made. An early California Supreme Court
case held that an oral modification is not executed under section 1698,
even if full performance by both parties is alleged, unless some of
the objective conduct by one or both parties was not required by the
written contract and is referable to the oral agreement.8 5 That holding
is presumably still good law and should apply with even more force
to a case in which the performance by only one party is alleged.
Summary
Although section 1698 appears to be a radical departure from
the common law rule, courts have so interpreted and limited the statute
that it requires a different result than would the common law in only
a small fraction of the cases that can arise involving modification of
a written contract. Both section 1698 and the common law require
an executory modification to be supported by consideration. The
most significant difference between section 1698, as interpreted by
the courts, and the common law is that a wholly executory modification
supported by consideration is enforceable under section 1698 only if
it is in writing; at common law no writing is required.
A written or oral gratuitous agreement to alter a written con-
tract-which can take the form of a reduction in the promissee's
performance, an extension of time for the promissee's performance, an
increase in the promisor's performance, or a waiver of a condition
precedent to the promisor's performance-simply constitutes a promise
to make a gift. Under both section 1698 and the common law such
an agreement is enforceable only to the extent that the promisor has
84. Cf. Scott v. TraveLodge Corp., 265 Cal. App. 2d 881, 71 Cal. Rptr. 547
(1968); Roberts v. Wachter, 104 Cal. App. 2d 271, 231 P.2d 534 (1951).
85. MacKenzie v. Hodgkin, 126 Cal. 591,-598, 59 P. 36, 38 (1899).
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performed the agreement, unless the promissee has materially changed
his position in reliance on the gratuitous promise. The promisor can-
not demand restitution of increased compensation already paid pur-
suant to an oral agreement, nor can he demand full performance under
the written contract if he has already accepted reduced performance.
In the case of a gratuitous waiver of a condition or extension of time
for performance, the promisor cannot assert the promisee's failure to
perform the condition or his failure to render timely performance as
a breach of the contract or as a justification for his own failure to
perform. He may, however, revoke the gratuitous waiver or time ex-
tension at any time and demand performance of the terms of the writ-
ten contract for the future.
Except when barred by the Statute of Frauds, an oral modifica-
tion supported by consideration is always enforceable at common law.
Under section 1698, such an agreement is enforceable to the extent
that it has been performed by both parties or to the extent that one
party has rendered performance not required by the original written
contract and referable to the oral agreement. Absent a material
change of position by a party in reliance on the agreement, it is unen-
forceable to the extent that neither party has rendered referable per-
formance.
Other Statutes Limiting Oral Modification
An examination of two other statutes is necessary before Calif-
ornia law governing modification of written contracts can be intelli-
gently evaluated. One is section 2-209 of the Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC) which bars oral modification only when the prior written
contract contains an express provision requiring modification to be
made in writing. The other is section 2209 of the California Com-
mercial Code which, although enacted as a part of the California ver-
sion of the Uniform Commercial Code, replaces part of UCC section
2-209 with a rule similar to section 1698.
UCC Section 2-209
The Uniform Commercial Code rule governing modification of
written contracts was derived from a similar statute enacted in New
York in 1941:
An executory agreement hereafter made shall be ineffective to
change or modify, or to discharge in whole or in part, a writ-
ten agreement or other written instrument hereafter executed
which contains a provision to the effect that it cannot be changed
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orally, unless such executory agreement is in writing and signed
by the party against whom enforcement of the change, modifi-
cation or discharge is sought.86
Like section 1698, the New York rule was adopted simultaneously
with the elimination of the seal and the abrogation of the common
law rule that a sealed instrument could not be modified except in
writing. 87 The New York Law Revision Commission, which proposed
the statute, identified as its purposes avoiding fraudulent claims of
modification,88 increasing certainty in contractual relations, and bring-
ing to the attention of the parties to a written contract the effects of
their acts. 9 In 1952, in response to a decision90 which enforced an
oral agreement on the ground that it constituted an oral termination
and substituted oral contract, the law revision commission recommend-
ed, and the legislature enacted, an amendment that expressly precluded
that interpretation and attempted to insure that the statute's goal of
certainty of contract could not be undermined by other similar judicial
limitations. 91 Nonetheless, the New York courts were unwilling to
invalidate oral modifications supported by consideration when to do
so would result in a loss of reliance to the party seeking to enforce the
oral agreement or a windfall to 'the other party.92  They soon formu-
lated an exception that is remarkably like the Godbey rule: An oral
modification supported by consideration is enforceable if one party has
rendered performance that 'is "unequivocally referable" to the alleged
oral agreement. 93 In addition, an, exeoutory oral modification, whether
or not supported by consideration, may be rendered enforceable on the
theory of equitable estoppel if the party seeking to enforce the oral
agreement has materially. changed his position in reliance on the other
party's oral promise.94
In adopting the private Statute of Frauds principle of the New
86. Act of April 13, 1941, [19411 N.Y. Laws, ch. 329, § 4 at 1008, as amended,
as N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw § 15-301(1) (McKinney 1964).
87. Id. § 2, at 1006-07.
88. NEw YoRK STATE, REPORT OF THE LAw RE IsioN COMMN 359 (1941).
89. NEw YORK STATE, REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COMM'N 41 (1952).
90. Green v. Doniger, 300 N.Y. 238,90 N.E.2d 56 (1949).
91. Act of April 19, 1952, [1952] N.Y. Laws, ch. 831, §§ 1 & 2, at 1809,
codified as N.Y. GEN. OBLiG. LAW § 15-301(2) (McKinney 1964).
92. See generally Note, Modification of- a Contract in New York: Criteria for
Enforcement, 35 U. Cm. L. REv. 173 (1967).
93. Bakhshandeh v. American Cyanamid Co., 8 App. Div. 2d 35, 38, 185 N.Y.S.
2d 635, 638 (Sup. Ct. 1959), affd, 8 N.Y.2d 981, 169 N.E.2d 188, 204 N.Y.S.2d 881
(1960).
94. Meadow Brook Nat'l Bank v. Feraca, 33 Misc. 2d 616, 224 N.Y.S.2d 846
(Sup. Ct. 1962).
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York statute, the commissioners of the UCC made two significant
changes. First, in order to increase the likelihood that the parties to
a contract are aware of the implications of their actions, they required
that in certain circumstances the private Statute of Frauds provision
on a form contract be signed separately. Second, instead of promul-
gating a rigid rule and leaving to the courts the task of creating ex-
ceptions to avoid unjust results, the commissioners included an express
exception based on the theories of waiver and estoppel. UCC section
2-209, as enacted by the fifty jurisdictions other than California in
which the code has been adopted,95 provides:
(1) An agreement modifying a contract within this article
needs no consideration to be binding.
(2) A signed agreement which excludes modification or
rescission except by a signed writing cannot be otherwise mod-
ified or rescinded, but except as between merchants such a re-
quirement on a form supplied by the merchant must be separately
signed by the other party.
(3) The requirements of the statute of frauds section of
this Chapter (Section 2-201) must be satisfied if the contract,
as modified, is within its provisions.
(4) Although an attempt at modification or rescission does
not satisfy the requirements of subsection (2) or (3) it can
operate as a waiver.
(5) A party who has made a waiver affecting an executory
portion of the contract may retract the waiver by reasonable
notification received by the other party that strict performance
will be required of any term waived, unless the retraction would
be unjust in view of a material change of position in reliance
on the waiver.
Subsection 1 of UCC section 2-209 abolishes the pre-existing
duty rule. Thus, unlike the common law and section 1698, the Uni-
form Commercial Code allows enforcement of executory gratuitous
written modifications and, when the private Statute of Frauds is not
invoked in the original contract, allows enforcement of executory oral
modifications not barred by the Statute of Frauds. The official com-
ments to UCC section 2-209 make clear that the rejection of the
pre-existing duty rule was based on a judgment that, when legitimate
business considerations impel a party to relieve another of a part of
his obligations under a written contract or to increase the compensa-
tion to be paid for the other party's performance, such an agreement
95. California is the only jurisdiction that has altered section 2-209 in the
course of enacting the code. PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE, REPORT No. 2, at 34-35 (1964).
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should, in general, be enforceable. 96 Since all modification agree-
ments are subject to the Uniform Commercial Code's requirement of
"good faith," UCC section 2-209 will not allow enforcement of a
gratuitous modification procured by economic coercion or when no
valid business reason exists for the modification. 97  In addition, the
good faith standard means that an agreement procured in bad faith
will not be rendered enforceable by the presence of "a mere technical
consideration."9 8  The abolition of the pre-existing duty rule, despite
its reliance on the nebulous good faith standard, has engendered al-
most no litigation in the fifty-one jurisdictions that have enacted the
code.99
Subsection 2 purports to bar oral modification or rescission of a
written contract containing a valid private Statute of Frauds provision.
In effect, the parties can choose whether modification or a written con-
tract will be governed by the common law, as liberalized by the aboli-
tion of the pre-existing duty rule, or by a rule analogous to Califor-
nia's section 1698. Although the bar of subsection 2 is expressed in
unqualified terms, its scope is limited by subsections 4 and 5, which
permit a modification not meeting the requirements of subsection 2
to operate as a waiver. The concept of a waiver appears to be an
inappropriate characterization of most forms of oral modification other
than an agreement to extend time for performance, accept reduced
performance, or forgive a condition precedent. However, the official
comments to section 2-209 make clear that subsections 4 and 5 can
be applied to enforce any form of executed oral modification:
Subsection (4) is intended ... to prevent contractual provisions
excluding modification except by a signed writing from limit-
ing in other respects the legal effect of the parties' later con-
duct. The effect of such conduct as a waiver is further regulated
in subsection (5). 100
Thus, to the extent that the parties have performed an oral modifica-
tion, it is enforceable as a waiver effected by their conduct. To the
extent that the modification is executory, it constitutes a waiver but
is revocable by either party unless the other party has materially
changed his position in reliance on the oral modification.
96. UNIFORM COMmERCIAL CODE § 2-209, Comments 1 & 2. See also W.
HAWLAN ., SALES AND BULK SALES 11-14 (1958).
97. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-209, Comment 2.
98. Id.
99. California enacted section 2-209(1) -without revision. See CAL. CoMM.
CODE§ 2209(1) (West 1964).
100. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-209, Comment 4.
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The waiver and estoppel limitations on UCC section 2-209
have almost exactly the same effect as the Julian-Stoltenberg and God-
bey limitations on section 1698.101 If the oral modification is not
supported by consideration, it constitutes an enforceable waiver to the
extent that it is executed by the conduct of the promissor. To the
extent that the modification is executory, it is revocable by the prom-
isor and, therefore, unenforceable. If the modification is supported
by consideration, it is clearly enforceable as a mutual waiver if both
parties have performed. If only one party has performed, the modi-
fication will be enforceable as an irrevocable waiver if "retraction would
be -unjust in view of a material change in position in reliance on the
waiver. 10 2  The only reported case interpreting this language held
that referable performance by one party can constitute sufficient re-
liance:
A written agreement which provides that it cannot be modified
except by a writing signed by both parties to the agreement
can be changed by a course of actual performance. Part per-
formance which is said to be taken in consequence of an oral
understanding which modifies one of the terms of the agreement
will not be construed to so modify unless it is unequivocally
referable to such new understanding. 10 3
California Commercial Code Section 2209
When California enacted the Uniform Commercial Code, it re-
jected the private Statute of Frauds provision of UCC section 2-209
and substituted a rule similar to section 1698.104 This change was
first suggested by the California State Bar Committee on the Commer-
cial Code, whose report simply stated:
It is the opinion of the subcommittee [examining Article 1 of the
UCC] that [section 2-209] is improper under the existing
state of law in California that it should be modified as respects
[subsection 2] so that this section would read in the same man-
ner as the present Civil Code Section 1698 ... .10
In a study commissioned by the Senate Fact Finding Committee on
the Judiciary to analyze suggested changes from the official draft of
101. See generally Comment, The Mechanics of Parol Modification of Contracts
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 29 U. PITT. L. REv. 665 (1968).
102. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-209(5).
103. All-Year Golf, Inc. v. Products Investors Corp., 34 App. Div. 2d 246, 250,
310 N.Y.S.2d 881, 885 (1970).
104. Cal. Stat. 1963, ch. 819, at 1862.
105. State Bar of California, Interim Report of the Comm. on the Commercial
Code, in CALIFORNIA SENATE FACT FINDING COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, SIXTH PROGRESS
REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE 340 (1961).
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the Uniform Commercial Code, Professors Harold Marsh, Jr., and
William Warren approved in substance the State Bar Committee's
recommedation. However, instead of replacing subsection 2 of sec-
tion 2-209 with the exact language of section 1698, they recom-
mended a modified version of section 1698 which expressly over-
ruled the Godbey exception and required full performance by both
parties as a prerequisite to the enforcement of an oral alteration. 10 6 The
legislature subsequently enacted the version of subsection 2 recom-
mended by Professors Marsh and Warren:
(1) An agreement modifying a contract within this division
needs no consideration to be binding.
(2) A written contract within this division may only be
modified by a written agreement or an oral agreement fully
executed by both parties.
(3) The requirements of the statute of frauds section of
this division (Section 2201) must be satisfied if the contract as
modified is within its provisions.
(4) Although an attempt at modification or rescission does
not satisfy the requirements of subdivision (2) or (3) it can
operate as a waiver.
(5) A party who has made a waiver affecting an executory
portion of the contract may retract the waiver by reasonable
notification received by the other party that strict performance
will be required of any term waived, unless the retraction would
be unjust in view of a material change of position in reliance
on the waiver' 07
The California version adopts subsection (1) of the official text
abolishing the pre-existing duty rule. Since section 1698 allows en-
forcement of gratuitous oral or written modifications and both section
1698 and subdivision 2 of section 2209 invalidate executory gratuitous
oral alterations, subdivision 1 of section 2209 changes California law
only with respect to executory gratuitous written modifications.
Subdivision 2 alters California law in its rejection of the Godbey
rule. Marsh and Warren gave only a cryptic and conclusory justifica-
tion for replacing the UCC private Statute of Frauds provision with
the California rule:
California has long had the requirement that written con-
tracts be modified only by another writing or by an executed
oral agreement. Although this rule has been disapproved by
some of the leading scholars, it has a defensible basis: that
106. March & Warren, Report on Proposed Amendments to the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, in CALIFoRNIA SENATE FAcr FNDiNG COMM. ON THE JUDICUaRY, S=xm
PROGRESS REPORT TO THE LEGISLATuRE 436 (1961).
107. CAL. COMM. CODE § 2209 (West Supp. 1961).
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parties claiming modification of a contract must be able to prove
the change by something other than parol.10 8
In recommending the rejection of the Godbey rule, they apparently
misconceived both the origin of and the justification for the exception:
[T]he unwarranted decision which held that "executed" may
mean executed on only one side, according to the original terms
of the agreement, should be corrected. Godbey & Sons v. Deane.
• . . This type of "execution" obviously furnishes no reliable
evidence that the modification was actually agreed upon. 109
The implication in this statement that Godbey constituted a break with
prior law or a change in the outcome of cases is simply wrong. God-
bey merely announced explicitly a rule that had been applied con-
sistently by California courts either directly, by stating a result without
explanation, or indirectly, by constructing or expanding mitigating ex-
ceptions to section 1698.11° Section 2209(2) does not overrule a
single "unwarranted decision"; it attempts to create a far stricter rule
than has ever been applied in California.
By referring only to the evidentiary policy behind section 1698
in their criticism of Godbey, Marsh and Warren overlooked the com-
peting policy considerations that prompted the courts to limit the scope
of section 1698. No doubt full performance by both parties is nor-
mally more reliable evidence of the existence and terms of an oral
modification than is performance by only one party. On the other
hand, referable performance by one party is some evidence of a modi-
fication, and it also normally constitutes a reliance interest that would
be sacrificed if the agreement were held unenforceable. California
courts have been properly reluctant to condone such an inequitable
result in the name of certainty of contract or evidentiary clarity when
a party has entered into and relied on a bargained exchange without
knowledge of its invalidity.
Experience -under section 1698, which has been the law in Calif-
ornia for almost 100 years, demonstrates that, despite a statute barring
oral modification, the parties to private contracts will continue to enter
into and perform in reliance on oral agreements to modify written con-
tracts. If the law is to avoid injustice, rules such as section 1698 and
section 2209 must be subject to sufficiently flexible limitations or ex-
ceptions to avoid becoming instruments of fraud and unjust enrich-
ment. Ironically, although the California Advisory Committee on the
108. Marsh & Warren, supra note 106, at 453.
109. Id.
110. See text accompanying notes 53-83 supra.
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Uniform Commercial Code recommended that Godbey be rejected, it
recommended retention of subsections 4 and 5 of section 2-209,
which constitute a mitigating exception substantially similar to the
Godbey rule.111 California appellate courts have not yet had occasion
to interpret the scope of the waiver and estoppel exceptions to section
2209, but, in light of their past construction of section 1698 and con-
sistent with the interpretation given those exceptions in other jurisdic-
tions that have adopted the Uniform Commercial Code's private Stat-
ute of Frauds rule, they will probably apply them liberally to make
an oral modification enforceable to the extent that a party has ren-
dered referable performance or otherwise relied.
Condusions and Recommendations
Necessary Linitations on a Rule Invalidating Oral Modification of
Written Contracts
The purpose of the Califorma rule barring oral modification and
the Uniform Commercial Code's private Statute of Frauds provision
is to promote certainty in contractual relations. The California rule
applies to all written contracts while the UCC rule applies only when
invoked by the parties. But the policies justifying a refusal to enforce
an oral modification, as well as those calling for enforcement in certain
classes of cases, apply equally to both statutory techniques. Both
rules protect a party to a written contract against a fraudulent allega-
tion of an oral modification. Both tend to induce the parties to a
written contract to put their modification agreements in writing, thus
increasing the formality of the modification procedure, making the
parties more aware that they will be bound by the agreement, and
reducing the potential for disputes over the existence and terms of the
agreement. Finally, both rules tend to make the work of the courts
easier and more efficient. To the extent that parties put their modi-
fications in a signed writing, the incidence of litigation over the exist-
ence and terms of such agreements is reduced and the fact-finding
process is sumplified in the event of litigation. By making executory
oral modifications invalid per se, the rule relieves the courts of the
necessity to resolve the parties' conflicting parol claims.
Unfortunately, experience in every jurisdiction that has enacted
a statute barring oral modification of written contracts demonstrates
that, no matter how explicit the statutory prohibition, private parties
i11. See text accompanying notes 100-02 supra.
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will continue to make and rely on such oral agreements. Once the
parties have attempted to modify their contract orally, much of the
justification for refusing enforcement collapses, and other policy con-
siderations arise calling for enforcement. First, when the rule has
failed to induce the parties to commit their agreement to writing,
the policy of making the parties aware of the implications of their
actions and reducing uncertainty, ambiguity, and disagreement as to
the terms of the agreement become meaningless. Second, the danger
of a fraudulent allegation of an oral modification is counterbalanced
by the danger that, under a strict rule invalidating oral modification,
a party will fraudulently induce performance by making an oral agree-
ment he knows to be invalid, then avoid his reciprocal performance
by asserting the rule against oral modification. Third, even in the
absence of fraud, refusal to enforce an oral agreement on which one
party has relied can result in an unjust loss of reliance to that party
or a windfall to the other. Finally, a rule invalidating the oral modi-
fication conflicts with the general policy of enforcing bargained ex-
changes between private parties.
Once an oral modification has been made, the only justifications
remaining for the rule barring enforcement are (1) that invalidating
the agreement relieves a court of the necessity to resolve the parol
claims of the parties and determine the issues of the existence and
terms of the agreement and (2) that penalizing a party who entered
such an agreement without knowledge of its invalidity will deter others
from making oral modifications in the future. These policies are not
frivolous, but they are not sufficiently compelling to justify a blanket
rule. When neither party has rendered referable performance or oth-
erwise changed his position in reliance on an oral modification, refusal
to enforce it will result only in a loss of the parties' expectancy under
the agreement and will restore their rights and duties under the original
contract; it will not result in a loss of reliance by one party or a
windfall to the other. In addition, since there is no referable perform-
ance, the sole evidence of the oral agreement will normally be the
conflicting, self-serving parol claims of the parties. In such a case,
the interest of the judicial system in inducing the certainty and formal-
ity of written agreements and in avoiding litigation over the existence
and terms of parol agreements justifies rejection of the common law
rule in favor of the California rule.
When both parties have performed an oral modification, on the
other hand, it is equally clear that a rule invalidating the oral agree-
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ment and allowing enforcement of the original written contract would
be senseless. The danger of fraud is negligible since the party seek-
ing to avoid the agreement has demonstrated his assent to the modifi-
cation through his conduct. The evidentiary problem in proving the
existence and terms of the agreement is minimized since the parties'
performance provides a means of evaluating their parol claims. In
addition, judicial economy and efficiency are clearly not served by
allowing a party to instigate a lawsuit in order to undo the executed
agreement and restore the rights and duties of the parties under the
original written contract. Both the California rule and the UCC rule
properly validate oral modifications to the extent that they are per-
formed by both parties.
When only one party has rendered performance inconsistent with
the original written contract and referable to an alleged oral modifica-
tion, a strict rule invalidating oral modification results in an inequitable
loss of reliance to the party seeking to enforce the agreement. Were
it plausible to assume that most private parties would be aware of the
rule and would be induced to commit their modifications to writing,
such results could be justified as a necessary cost of a desirable rule
promoting certainty in contractual relations and reducing the inci-
dence and complexity of litigation. Nevertheless, the many cases that
have arisen under both the California rule and the New York rule in
which a party has relied on an oral agreement apparently barred by
the relevant statute demonstrate that many people-because they are
unaware of the statute, because they do not consider the legal enforce-
ability of their agreements at the time they are made, or because they
feel that an insistence on a formal writing connotes distrust-are not
induced by the statutory prohibition to put their modifications in writ-
ing.
A rule barring oral modification is simply unrealistic unless it
is limited to avoid creating injustice when a party has relied on an oral
modification and to prevent the rule from becoming an instrument
of fraud when invoked by a knowledgeable party against a party who
was unaware of it. Absent such a limitation, the rule is not only
unsound, it is unenforceable. A court, faced with a case in which it
believes that the parties agreed to an oral modification which was
subsequently relied on by one party, will find some means of avoiding
the application of the rule. In California, courts employed a variety
of techniques to enforce such agreements until their sub rosa rule was
made explicit in Godbey. In New York, the courts have applied the
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estoppel doctrine and developed the "unequivocally referable" test to
achieve the same result. Even the Uniform Commercial Code, which
attempts to ensure that the parties are aware of the necessity for a
writing by limiting the rule to cases in which they include such a
provision in their written contract, recognizes the fact that some parties
will make and rely on oral modifications and makes such agreements
enforceable as waivers to the extent that a party has performed or
otherwise relied.
A rule barring oral modifications, whether it applies to all written
contracts or only to written contracts expressly invoking a private
Statute of Frauds, is justified on policy grounds to the extent that it
invalidates alleged executory oral agreements that have not been per-
formed by one or both parties. Either rule must, however, be expressly
limited so that it does not invalidate oral modifications that have been per-
formed or otherwise relied on by a party. UCC section 2-209 con-
tains such a limitation, but it is misleading and subject to misinterpre-
tation because it characterizes an agreement made enforceable by the
conduct of one or both parties as a "waiver," which is an inappropriate
description of many forms of agreements that should be directly en-
forceable due to referable performance. The Godbey rule, which char-
acterizes such agreements as "executed" and therefore directly enforce-
able under the terms of the statute, is a clearer and more appropriate
limitation on either form of statute barring oral modification. What-
ever rule is applied in California, the Godbey limitation should be
expressly incorporated into the statute.
Express incorporation of the Godbey exception is particularly
important in California Commercial Code Section 2209. Subdivisions
4 and 5 of that statute will probably be interpreted to arrive at a
result similar to Godbey, but the express rejection of Godbey in the
comments to section 2209 and the misleading characterization of oral
modifications made enforceable by reliance as "waivers" may inhibit
the evolution of such a rule or, at the very least, mislead private
parties as to their legal rights when one party has relied on an oral
modification.
Comparison of the California Rule with the UCC Rule and the
Common Law
The California rule, as limited by the Godbey exception, invali-
dates only two subsets of oral modifications of written contracts.
First, gratuitous oral modifications are unenforceable insofar as they
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have not been performed by the promisor. This result comports with
the common law rule invalidating all forms of executory gifts and is
supported by sound policy. It avoids the danger of a fraudulent alle-
gation of a gratuitous modification, avoids the necessity to litigate the
existence and terms of such an agreement when it can be proven only
by the parol claims of the parties, and yet avoids upsetting such agree-
ments when their existence is proved by the conduct of the promisor
in executing the agreement. In the rare case in which the promissee
has changed his position in reliance on the gratuitous promise, the
doctrine of promissory estoppel is sufficient to avoid an unjust result.
Second, oral modifications supported by consideration cannot be
enforced by a party who has not rendered performance referable to
the oral agreement. This result is a departure from the common law,
but it, too, is supported by sound policy. When a party has not
rendered performance inconsistent with the terms of the written con-
tract, refusal to enforce the oral agreement will not result in a loss of
reliance. If a party has changed his position in reliance on such an
agreement other than by performing, the doctrine of estoppel is avail-
able to protect his reliance interest. Normally all a party has to lose
in such a case is his expectancy under the oral agreement, and refusal
to enforce the wholly executory oral modification simply restores the
rights and duties of the parties under the original written contract. The
infringement on the freedom of contract resulting from such a rule
is a small price to pay to avoid the uncertainty to the parties and the
cost to the courts entailed in permitting a party to a written contract to
litigate the existence and terms of an executory oral modification that
can be proven only by resolving the conflicting parol claims of the
parties. In addition, refusal to enforce wholly executory oral modi-
fications supported by consideration greatly reduces the danger of
fraudulent allegations of oral modification. So long as a party must
perform pursuant to an alleged oral modification before it is po-
tentially enforceable, he must take a substantial risk in attempting to
enforce a fraudulent agreement: If he fails to convince the fact-finder
of the existence of the agreement, the defrauding party will lose the
value of his allegedly referable performance. If such modifications
are potentially enforceable without referable performance, as they are
under the common law, the risk to the defrauding party is reduced
and the temptation to invent such modifications is increased.
The Uniform Commercial Code's private Statute of Frauds rule,
which has not been adopted in California, applies only when invoked
by the parties in the original written contract, but it is subject to sub-
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stantially the same limitations as the more general California rule. It
invalidates the same two subsets of the oral modifications to which
it applies that are invalidated by the California rule: gratuitous oral
modifications not rendered a "waiver" by the performance of the prom-
isor and oral modifications supported by consideration not rendered
an irrevocable "waiver" through the reliance of a party who has per-
formed. The Uniform Commercial Code's technique of tying the in-
validity of oral modifications to the parties' express invocation of the
private Statute of Frauds thus does not lead to substantially greater
certainty in contractual relations than does the more general California
rule. By requiring that the bar on oral modifications be included in
the contract and, in some cases, be separately signed, the UCC rule
may tend to make more parties to written contracts aware of the
desirability of committing modifications to writing, but this effect is
not likely to be substantial. Many cases have arisen in both New York
and California in which parties to a written contract that requires mod-
ifications to be made in writing have nonetheless made oral modifica-
tion agreements, and the requirement that a nonmerchant separately
sign the private Statute of Frauds provision in a form contract provided
by a merchant will have an effect only to the extent that the non-
merchant reads the boilerplate that he is signing and remembers it
later when the contract is modified.
The principle difference between the California rule and the UCC
rule is that, if the written contract does not invoke the private Statute
of Frauds, the Uniform Commercial Code does not invalidate gratu-
itous oral modifications not executed by the promisor and oral mod-
ifications supported by consideration not performed by either party.
But, as was demonstrated in the prior discussion of the California
rule, refusal to enforce such wholly executory oral modifications is
justifiable on policy grounds irrespective of the intent of the parties.
Invalidating such agreements does not result in a loss of reliance to
one party or a windfall to the other; litigation over such agreements
entails the resolution of the conflicting parol claims of the parties;
and enforcement of such agreements increases the danger of fraudu-
lent allegations of oral modifications.
The California rule, which invalidates such wholly executory oral
modifications in all cases, is, therefore, preferable to both the UCC
rule, which invalidates such agreements only when the private Statute
of Frauds was validly invoked in the original contract, and the com-
mon law rule, which allows enforcement of such agreements in all
1580 [Vol. 23
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cases. California should, therefore, retain in substance its general pro-
hibition against enforcement of executory oral modifications of written
contracts embodied in both section 1698 of the Civil Code and section
2209 of the Commercial Code.
Resolution of the Inconsistencies Between Section 1698 and Section 2209
As has been shown, California has two similar statutes govern-
ing modification of written contracts. Commercial Code section 2209
governs written contracts involving "transactions in goods," 112 and
Civil Code section 1698 governs all other written contracts. The stat-
utes are inconsistent in two respects. First, the two statutes are sub-
ject to different formulations of the mitigating rule allowing enforce-
ment of oral modifications supported by consideration and performed
on one side. Section 1698 is limited by the Godbey rule, while section
2209 expressly precludes the Godbey interpretation but is similarly
limited by the waiver and estoppel provisions taken from the Uniform
Commercial Code. Second, section 2209 adopted the UCC's provision
abolishing the pre-existing duty rule and, therefore, allows enforce-
ment of executory gratuitous written modifications which are not en-
forceable under section 1698. Since no characteristic of contracts in-
volving or not involving a "transaction in goods" justifies a difference
in the outcome of cases under section 1698 and section 2209, clarity
and simplicity call for a resolution of these inconsistencies between
the two statutes.
As was shown above, the Godbey rule is the clearer and more
appropriate formulation of the limitation on the rule barring executory
oral modification. It should be expressly incorporated in the text of
both section 1698 and subdivision 2 of section 2209; subdivisions 4
and 5 of section 2209 should be repealed.
The sole remaining inconsistency between the two California stat-
utes is the applicability of the pre-existing duty rule to executory
written modifications. No strong policy militates for the retention or
abolition of the rule in such cases. As was noted by the official com-
ments to the Uniform Commercial Code and by commentators dis-
112. "'Goods' means all things (including specially manufactured goods) which
are movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale other than the
money in which the price is to be paid, investment securities ... and things in action.
'Goods' also includes the unborn young of animals and growing crops and other
identified things attached to realty .... ." CAL. COMM. CODE § 2105(1) (West
1964). See also id. § 2107.
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cussing the code, there are often sound business reasons for agreeing
to a gratuitous modification of a written contract. In such a case, if
the parties have eliminated evidentiary problems by putting the agree-
ment in writing, the interests of certainty in contractual relations would
be served by enforcing the modification. The principal danger in-
volved in enforcing such agreements is that the promissor might have
been induced to agree by means of a "holdup"--a refusal to perform
a contractual duty unless the other party agrees to a gratuitous modifi-
cation-or through some other form of economic coercion. This dan-
ger can be avoided by making economic coercion a defense to enforce-
ment of a modification. New York, for example, has abolished the
pre-existing duty rule for written modifications, and the New York
courts have created an exception to the statute by finding a lack of
consent to the agreement, irrespective of the signed writing, when the
agreement was procured by "economic duress. 11 3 Similarly, the Uni-
form Commercial Code avoids enforcing modifications procured by
economic coercion by requiring that all offers and agreements be made
in "good faith.""' 4  Accordingly, the substance of section 2209(1),
which abolishes the pre-existing duty rule, should be retained, and a
similar provision should be included in section 1698.
These changes-codifications of the Godbey rule in both section
1698 and section 2209 and abolition of the pre-existing duty rule
with respect to written modifications -under section 1698-would in-
sure that the rules governing modification of contracts in the Com-
mercial Code would be consistent with those in the Civil Code. One
further change in form, rather than substance, would make the Civil
Code and Commercial Code statutes identical. Commercial Code sec-
tion 2209 governs modification of oral, as well as written, contracts:
Subdivision 1 validates gratuitous modifications of oral contracts and
subdivision 3 requires that all modification agreements comply with the
requirement of the Statute of Frauds. Thus any agreement not barred
by the Statute of Frauds-whether written or oral, executed or execu-
tory, and whether or not supported by consideration-is enforceable
to modify an oral contract. The Civil Code arrives at the same result
through a separate statute, section 1697, which provides that: "A con-
tract not in writing may be altered in any respect by the consent of the
parties, in writing, without new consideration .... ."I" As applied to
113. See The Mechanics of Parol Modification, supra note 101.
114. See text accompanying notes 97-98 supra.
115. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1697 (West 1954).
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oral modifications, this statute is limited by the Statute of Frauds.116
The Civil Code and Commercial Code provisions could be made identical
either by breaking section 2209 into two statutes, one governing modifi-
cation of oral contracts and one governing modification of written con-
tracts, or by amalgamating sections 1697 and 1698 into a single statute.
Since clarity and certainty are served by expressly noting that the
requirements of the Statute of Frauds must be satisfied by any modifi-
cation of an oral or written contract if the contract, as modified, falls
within its provisions, a single statute governing modification of both
oral and written contracts would be more concise.
116. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 1624 (West 1954).
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APPENDIX
PROPOSED LEGISLATION
Section 1. Section 1698 of the Civil Code is amended to read:
§ 1698. Alteration of contracts
(1) Except as provided by this section, a contract may be al-
tered in any respect by the consent of the parties without new con-
sideration.
(2) An agreement altering any executory portion of a written
contract is unenforceable unless the agreement is in writing and signed
by the party against whom enforcement is sought except to the extent
that the party seeking enforcement of the alteration has rendered per-
formance, referable to the agreement, not required by the terms of
the written contract.
(3) The requirements of the statute of frauds section of this
division (Section 1624) must be complied with if the contract as
altered is within its provisions.
Section 2. Section 2209 of the Commercial Code is amended to read:
§ 2209. Modification
(1) Except as provided in this section, a contract within this
article may be modified in any respect by the consent of the parties,
without new consideration.
(2) An agreement modifying any executory portion of a writ-
ten contract is enforceable unless it is in writing and signed by the
party against whom enforcement is sought except to the extent that
the party seeking enforcement of the modification has rendered per-
formance, referable to the agreement, not required by the terms of
the written contract.
(3) The requirements of the statute of frauds section of this
division (Section 2201) must be complied with if the contract as mod-
ified is within its terms.
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